Thomas kuhn the structure of scientific revolution summary

Monday, October 9, Short summary: Against the normal perception of science as a linear accumulation of knowledge, Kuhn attempts to view science as progressing in leaps from one "paradigm" to the next. Kuhn is revolutionary in the philosophy of science since he views scientific practice a something conducted by a community rather than a set of individuals.

Thomas kuhn the structure of scientific revolution summary

March 19, Note: I have tried to let Kuhn speak for himself whenever possible. The make is easier to distinguish the quotes from the paraphrases, I have written the quotes in boldface. All references are to the edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. These great works became paradigms because they were "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity," and "sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve.

Determination of significant fact: Attempts to increase the accuracy and scope with which facts like the specific gravities and compressibilities of material, electrical conductivities and contact potentials occupy a significant fraction of the literature of experimental and observational science.

Matches of fact with theory: The articulation of theorywhich is " When Kuhn talks about the articulation of theory as a part of normal science, he is really referring to the development of models.

Thomas kuhn the structure of scientific revolution summary

While normal science is a highly determined kind of activity, Kuhn is quick to deny that he is slipping back to naive inductivism: The point, expanded in the postscript, is that scientists gain tacit knowledge of a theory through working through textbook or laboratory examples called exemplars.

Contrary to a popular picture of science, Kuhn insists that p. Kuhn is concerned to dispel the idea that the common occurrence of scientific discoveries disproves his thesis. For if normal science aims at discovery, and discoveries are novel, then normal science aims at novelty.

Kuhn claims that discoveries are always accompanied by changes in the prevailing paradigm. If he is right, then the existence of scientific discovery does not show that normal science aims at novelty, but only that novelty signals the end of normal science. All novelties of fact discoveries or theory lead to the end of normal science.

Normal science does not aim at its own demise. Therefore, normal science does not aim novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none.

The fact the normal science does not aim at novelty, as Kuhn has argued, cries out for explanation.

Anything to add?

As an instance of what Kuhn thinks is a general psychological phenomenon, he cites a study by J. In this psychological experiment, subjects are shown ordinary playing cards mixed up with some anomalous cards, like a black four of hearts.

Roughly speaking, the results show that subjects initially see what they expect to see either the four of spades, or the four of hearts. In sum, Kuhn seeks to explain the difficulty of discovery as an instance of the general psychological fact that our expectations cloud our perception of the world.

No Paradigm Change without Crisis: Nevertheless, a paradigm though resisting change is playing an essential role in allowing a scientist to recognize something as anomalous, as contrary to expectation, and this is an important precondition for discovery p. However, the process of improving fit between fact and theory is a part of normal science, so an anomaly, a failing of expectations, presents just another puzzle to be resolved by the construction of improved models.

That is the standard fare of normal science. It is a necessary part of what defines a crisis in normal science.

For, a sufficient number of compounded circles would provide perfect fit with the data at any one time. That Ptolemaic model would provide no discrepancies with existing data. Available observational tests, as we shall see more clearly below, provided no basis of a choice between them.

They do not, that is, treat anomalies as counterinstances, though in the vocabulary of philosophy of science that is what they are. From within a paradigm, from the viewpoint of normal science, anomalies are not seen as testing the theory. Yet Kuhn concedes p.

Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions - outline

There is a need to clarify what Kuhn is saying here. While uncritically taking the background theory for granted, normal science does subject the models derived from the theory to severe critical scrutiny. So normal science strives to bring theory and fact into closer agreement by calling its models into question without ever criticizing the background theory itself.A polemic against Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, claiming that the book was sociopolitical in origin, conventional (not revolutionary) in content, and ruinous in its influence.

Many if not most lay people have probably never heard of its author, Thomas Kuhn, or of his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, but their thinking has almost certainly been influenced. An Overview Of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions1 This review examines Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) very broadly, with the aim of understanding its essentials.

As you can gather from the title of Kuhn's book, he. Oct 04,  · Short summary: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions / Thomas Kuhn In "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" Thomas Kuhn presents a revolutionary approach to .

Summary of Thomas Kuhn’s ‘The Structure of Scientific Revolution’ Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions attempted to analyse the events, phenomena and the dynamics of the history of science itself - Summary of Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of .

A scientific revolution that results in paradigm change is analogous to a political revolution. Political revolutions begin with a growing sense by members of the community that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created.

Thomas Kuhn (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)